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Comments
LOCAL CONTROL OF POLLUTION
FROM FEDERAL FACILITIES
Each department, agency and instrumentality of the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1)
having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged
in any activity resulting or which may result, in the discharge of
air pollutants, shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and lo-
cal requirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution
to the same extent that any person is subject to such require-
ments.'
1. Clean Air Act § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970) (emphasis added).
The remaining portion of the section reads:
The President may exempt any emission source of any department,
agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compli-
ance with such a requirement if he determines it to be in the para-
mount interest of the United States to do so, except that no ex-
emption may be granted from section 111 (standards for perform-
ance for new stationary sources), and an exemption from section
112 (national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants)
may be granted only in accordance with section 112 (c). No such ex-
emption shall be granted due to lack of appropriation unless the
President shall have specifically requested such appropriation as
part of the budgetary process and the Congress shall have failed to
make available such requested appropriation. Any exemption shall
be for a period not in excess of one year, but additional exemptions
may be granted for periods of not to exceed one year upon the
President's making a new determination. The President shall re-
port each January to the Congress all exemptions from the re-
quirements of this section granted during the preceding calendar
year, together with his reason for granting each such exemption.
The provisions of the air, water and noise pollution control acts appearing
within this article are quoted from Statutes at Large and are referred to
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The United States Congress included within the Clean Air
Amendments of 19702 the above-quoted provision mandating fed-
eral agency compliance with local air pollution regulations. Simi-
larly-worded provisions subsequently were inserted in the Noise
Control Act of 19723 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act4
of the same year. There is little doubt that the three acts require
federal agency compliance with local emission standards for air,
water and noise pollution. A debate has arisen, however, as to
whether federal agencies must comply with local "procedural" re-
quirements such as those pertaining to the acquisition of permits.
Although on their faces the three acts appear to mandate federal
agency compliance with al pollution requirements, in at least three
instances 5 federal courts have held that federal agencies are not
in the text according to the section number by which they were designated
in the respective Congressional acts. There are minor word differences
in the provisions as they appear in Statutes at Large and as they appear
in the United States Code. The Statutes at Large, for example, will say
"this act" whereas the United States Code will say "this chapter." None
of the differences are material. The quotes are taken from the Statutes
at Large because in case of differences in language the wording of the
Statutes at Large is controlling.
2. At of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 5, 84 Stat. 1676.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4901 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. I, 1972).
5. Cal. v. Stastny, 4 ERC 1447 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 1972), appeal pending
9th circuit; Ky. v. Ruckelshaus, - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1974); 6 ERC 1644;
Alabama v. Seeber, No. 72-939 (N.D. Ala., June 5, 1973), notice of appeal
filed June 28, 1973.
There are two other cases involving section 118 of the Clean Air Act
but neither directly interprets the scope of the phrase "requirements re-
specting control and abatement of air pollution." In Puget Sound Air
Pollution Control Agency v. United States Veteran's Administration Hos-
pital, No. 59-73C3, 4 ELR 200010 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 1973), it was held
that the Clean Air Act does not give a municipal agency the right to assess
civil penalties and attorney's fees against a federal facility for violation
of local emission regulations, nor does it constitute a consent by the United
States to be sued for injunctive relief against such violations. In the case
of Milwaukee v. Veteran's Administration Center, 357 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.
Wis. 1973) the court held that sovereign immunity would not bar suit
against the Veteran's Center because Congress by enacting Section 118 of
the Clean Air Act consented to suits against agencies of the federal govern-
ment for violation of local requirements respecting control of air pollution.
Milwaukee County filed suit against the Veteran's Administration Center
for failure to comply with an ordinance requiring those who operate cer-
tain burning equipment to use dust separating equipment. There was no
mention in the court's opinion of any concern over whether the "require-
required to comply with state permit programs.
Several months ago the President of the United States revised
his executive order pertaining to control of pollution from federal
facilities to reflect these decisions. 6 In a related ,action the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency has refused to approve that portion
of California's water pollution control permit program covering
discharges of waste from federal facilities.7
The purpose of this article is to examine the three Congressional
acts relating to air, water and noise pollution and their legislative
history in an attempt to determine the mandated scope of federal
agency compliance with local pollution regulations. In view of the
fact that the Clean Air Act provision relating to control of pollu-
tion from federal facilities8 was the first such provision and ap-
parently the prototype of the provisions in the noise and water
pollution control acts, major emphasis will be placed on it.
It is the author's belief that
(1) the complementary nature of the three acts and the almost
identical wording of the provisions contained therein mandate uni-
form interpretation of the three provisions; and
(2) correctly interpreted the three provisions mandate federal
agency compliance with state and local procedural, as well as sub-
stantive, pollution control requirements.
TnE CLEAw Am ACT
The Clean Air Act 9 vests primary responsibility for air quality
control in the governments of the 50 states.10 The Act provides
ments" spoken of in Section 118 included those imposed by the Milwaukee
ordinance.
6. Exec. Order No. 11752, 38 Fed. Reg. 34793 (1973), superceding Exec.
Order No. 11507, 3 C.F.R. 1966-1970 Comp. at 889, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
7. 4 E.R. 676 (1973). The State of California challenged the Environ-
mental Protection Agency action in a suit filed Aug. 6, 1973 in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Also pending is the case of Cal. v. Morton,
C730984 ACW (N.D. Cal., filed June 12, 1973). In Morton the State of
California is seeking to establish its right to impose reasonable conditions
on the operation of the federal Central Valley (Water) Project. According
to Richard C. Jacobs of the California State Attorney General's Office in
San Francisco, California is basing its claim primarily on the 1902 Recla-
mation Act but interpretation of Section 313 of the federal Water Pollution
Control Act is also at issue.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2 (1970).
[voL. 11: 972, 1974] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
for the establishment of national ambient air standards for specific
pollutants'" but delegates to the individual states the responsibil-
ity for achieving and maintaining these air quality standards
within their respective borders. 12 The individual states also have
the discretion to impose more stringent air quality standards than
those established by the federal government if such are deemed
desirable. 3
Each state is required by the Clean Air Act to prepare and sub-
mit to the Environmental Protection Agency for approval a plan
for implementation, maintenance and enforcement of the national
ambient air standards.14 The plan must contain, among other
things, "emission limitations, schedules and timetables for compli-
ance with such limitations, and such other measures as may be
necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such primary
or secondary standard, including, but not limited to, land use and
transportation controls."'1
Section 118 of the Clean Air Act expressly provides that "[e] ach
department, agency and instrumentality of the ... Federal Gov-
ernment ... shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution to
the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements."' 6
The interpretive question thus posed is what pollution control "re-
quirements" are federal agencies obligated to comply with by vir-
tue of the Clean Air Act.
In the case of California v. Stastny, 7 the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California summarily held that the U.S.
Navy was not required to either apply for or obtain permits from
the Los Angeles County Pollution Control District prior to operat-
ing or using any equipment or machines at its Long Beach base.
Thereafter a permit dispute between Alabama air pollution offi-
cials on the one hand and the Tennessee Valley Authority and the
Army on the other was similarly resolved by the Federal District
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
15. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970).
17. 4 ERC 1447 (C.D. Cal., July 17, 1972), appeal pending 9th circuit.
Court for the Northern District of Alabama in the unreported case
of Alabama v. Seeber.'8
So far the only detailed opinion interpreting Section 118 of the
Clean Air Act is Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus 9 wherein the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court ruling that the sec-
tion requires federal compliance with "substantive provisions" of
the state's implementation plan such as emission standards and
compliance schedules but not with local permit procedures. In
Ruckelshaus the State of Kentucky contended that federal entities
operating equipment or installations which emit air contaminants
must comply with Kentucky law requiring procurement of permits.
The permit requirement was part of the implementation plan
adopted by the state pursuant to Section 110 of the Clean Air Act.20
After pointing out that the citizen suit provision of the Clean
Air Act, section 304,21 does not expressly authorize a suit to force
federal facilities to obtain operating permits from local agencies,
the appellate court stated:
Both the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the application of
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution are involved in the
decision of this case .... Every declaration of a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity must be strictly construed. [citation omitted]
Section 118 contains no waiver and that included in Section 304
does not permit suit to require owners and operators of federal
facilities to obtain permits from a state agency in order to continue
to operate. The two sections are part of the same Act and must
be read together. By failing to include a separate waiver of im-
munity in Section 118 Congress indicated that compliance with its
provisions may be compelled by suit only to the extent permitted
by Section 304.22
18. N.D. Ala. No. 72-939, June 5, 1973, notice of appeal filed June 28,
1973.
19. - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1974).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). This section provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any per-
son may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and(ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to
the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Con-
stitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, or(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
(f) For purposes of this section, the term 'emission standard or
Limitation' under this chapter means-(1) a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limita-
tion, standard of performance or emission standard....
22. - F.2d -, - (6th Cir. 1974); 6 ERC at 1647.
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The appellate court further noted:
An examination of the legislative history of the 1970 Act reveals
no congressional intent to subject federal instrumentalities and
agencies to state administrative regulations .... In absence of a
clear congressional purpose to subject federal agencies to state
regulation, the district court was prevented by the Supremacy
Clause from granting the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff.23
The Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Con-
stitution reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding. 2
The U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted the Supremacy
Clause as a mandate that the federal government be held immune
from state and local regulation. Chief Justice Marshall in the lead-
ing case of McCulloch v. Maryland25 wrote:
: I * the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the general government. This is, we think, the
unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution
has declared. 26
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have relied on the prece-
dent established in McCulloch to hold the federal government im-
mune from a broad range of local licensing and inspection laws.27
In Johnson v. Maryland28 the question before the Supreme Court
was whether a State could arrest, try and convict an on-duty postal
employee for driving a U.S. mail carrier without a state driver's
license. In holding that the postal employee was not subject to
state licensing laws the court said, in part,
With regard to taxation, no matter how reasonable, or how uni-
versal and undiscriminating, the State's inability to interfere has
23. Id.
24. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI § 2.
25. 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
26. Id. at 435.
27. See, e.g., Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943); Ariz. v. Cal.,
283 U.S. 423 (1931); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899).
28. 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
been regarded as established since McCulloch v. Maryland. The
decision in that case was not put upon any consideration of de-
gree but upon the entire absence of power on the part of the States
to touch, in that way at least, the instrumentalities of the United
States .... 29
The principal of federal government sovereignty is firmly estab-
lished and there is a dearth of cases allowing any kind of state
or local control over the federal government, its agencies or facil-
ities. The only line of cases which has diminished McCulloch to
any extent appears to be that which holds postal workers bound
to comply with local traffic regulations "in instances where no in-
consistent rule of conduct has been prescribed .. . by Congress
or the Postmaster General. 3 0
Extrapolating from these cases the federal district court for the
Western District of Virginia in 1956 ruled that vehicles owned and
operated by the United States are not by reason of such ownership
immune from the operation of state laws limiting the weight of
vehicles on state highways.31 Citing a number of cases dealing
with the violation of state or municipal traffic regulations by U.S.
mail carriers,32 the district court said:
The handling of the mails is a responsibility of the federal govern-
ment imposed on it by the Constitution. Even so the trend of au-
thority is to the effect that in performing these federal duties the
carriers of the mails are subject to reasonable local regulations
which are not inconsistent with the directions of their responsible
superiors and observance of which is not in derogation of the sov-
ereign authority of the United States. 3
The rationale of the court in holding the federal government sub-
ject to state law pertaining to the weight of vehicles using state
highways was that the state had a strong, judicially-recognized
interest in protecting and preserving its highways and that in the
case of exigency state law provided for the issuance of permits
to overweight vehicles.
84
Using the authority of this case it could be argued that given
the states' strong interest in the quality of the air (an interest
recognized in the Clean Air Act 5) and the intent of Congress ex-
29. Id. at 55.
30. Volger v. Greimann, 78 F. Supp. 575, 577 (D.C. Alas. 1948). See
also cases cited footnote 32, infra.
31. Va. v. Stiff, 144 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Va. 1956).
32. United States v. Hart, 26 F. Cas. 193 (No. 15,316) (1817); Common-
wealth v. Closson, 229 Mass. 329, 118 N.E. 653 (1918); Hall v. Common-
wealth, 129 Va. 738, 105 S.E. 551 (1921); Volger v. Greimann, 78 F. Supp.
575 (D.C. Ala. 1948).
33. 144 F. Supp. at 172.
34. Id. at 173.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (a) (3) (1970).
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pressed in the Clean Air Act that federal facilities comply with
at least local emission standards, it would not be unreasonable
under Supremacy Clause standards to subject federal agencies to
state procedural rules pertaining to air pollution. However, in
light of the clear language of McCulloch, perhaps these lower court
decisions cannot be safely relied upon. Since the Supreme Court
has clearly stated that Congress may expressly authorize federal
agency compliance with state and local laws,36 it becomes impor-
tant to investigate the express provisions of the Clean Air Act (and
later the water and noise pollution control acts).
History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970
Prior to the Clean Air Amendments of 197037 the Clean Air Act
required only that federal agencies
... to the extent practicable and consistent with the intent of the
United States and within any available appropriations, cooperate
with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and with
36. Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 446 (1943); Baltimore Nat. Bank
v. State Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 209, 211 (1936); Pacific Coast Dairy
Inc. v. Dept. of Agriculture of Calif., 318 U.S. 285, 296 (1943). A relevant
case dealing with a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity is Maun
v. United States, 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965), wherein the appellate court
was asked to interpret the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2011 et seq. (1954), to determine if the Atomic Energy Commission could
disregard local regulations in constructing overhead transmission lines for
the purpose of transmitting electric power generated by non-nuclear
means. Section 271 of the Act required the AEC to accede to the authority
and regulations of any federal, state or local agency with respect to the
generation, sale or transmission of electric power. The government's con-
tention was that the section related only to electric energy generated by
nuclear means and that as to energy produced by conventional means the
AEC should be immune from local regulations. The appellate court in
finding that the section referred to electric power generated by any means
stated:
We are not convinced, however, that Congress meant to confine
the limitation imposed by section 271 to . . . electric power pro-
duced by nuclear means. Had this been the intent it would have
been easy to express it by including in Section 271, a specific ref-
erence to nuclear production of electric power .... It also
seems to us that there is less reason to place emphasis upon
legislative history in a case such as this where the statute to be
construed is not ambiguous, than where the words of the statute
give rise to a legitimate doubt as to the meaning intended. 347
F.2d at 976.
37. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
any air pollution control agencies in preventing and controlling
pollution of the air .... 38
The failure of federal agencies to take positive steps toward pol-
lution control in accordance with this discretionary directive
prompted enactment of the current Clean Air Act provision man-
dating compliance with federal, state and local pollution control
requirements.3 9
The original House version of the current provision provided
that
... each department, agency and instrumentality in the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the Federal government ...
shall comply with applicable federal, State, interstate and local
emission standards and with the purposes of this Act .... 40
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in
its report on the House version of the bill stated that the above-
quoted provision would amend the Clean Air Act to "direct federal
agencies in the executive, legislative and judicial branches to com-
ply with applicable federal, State, interstate and local emission
standards."141 Explaining the need for such a provision the com-
mittee report statea,
Instead of exercising leadership in controlling or eliminating air
pollution the Federal Government has tended to be slow in this
respect. The foregoing provisions are designed to reverse this
tendency. The level of appropriations available for the modifica-
tion of Federal facilities to eliminate or reduce air pollution has
been inadequate. The Committee hopes that the administration
will seek and the Congress will provide adequate appropriations
to remedy this unfortunate situation.42
Rep. William L. Springer, ranking minority member of the House
Committee, during floor debate on the bill added the following
comment,
One of the frustrating aspects of air pollution legislation is the
presence of large Federal installations either operated directly by
the Government or under its direction which contaminate the at-
mosphere on a large scale. How can we expect cooperation or
38. Clean Air Act § 118, formerly § 7, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1, 77 Stat.
399 (1963), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857f (1970).
39. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COmmERCFE H.R. Rep. No.
1146, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 5360 (1970). Although the Clean Air Act man-
dates general compliance with federal, state, interstate and local pollution
control requirements, it vests the President with power to exempt federal
facilities from such compliance under certain specified conditions. For fur-
ther discussion of the President's power of exemption see text accompany-
ing footnotes 73-74, infra.
40. H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 24 (1970).
41. HousE CoMM. oN INTERSTATE & FOREIGN Com EIImc, H.R. REP. No.
1146, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 5359 (1970).
42. Id. at 5360.
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credibility for the governmental effort when the installations con-
trolled by Uncle Sam are some of the worst polluters? The Fed-
eral Government as much as some private business has dragged
its feet for purely economic reasons. Allowing the Government
to remain immune from the rules which we wish to impose on
others is wrong. Actually it should lead the way. Recognizing
the real considerations of national security might intervene in cer-
tain cases this bill requires Federal installations to meet whatever
standards those around them must meet and allows for exemptions
on the very limited basis of a year at a time.43
The original Senate version of the Clean Air Act Amendments
provided that each agency
... shall provide leadership in carrying out the policy and pur-
poses of this act and shall comply with the requirements of this
act in the same manner as any person must so comply .... 44
The report of the Senate Public Works Committee stated that
the Senate provision required that "federal facilities meet the emis-
sion standards necessary to achieve ambient air quality standards
as well as those established in other sections of Title I.'45
Although both the House and Senate Committee reports are
couched in terms of compliance with emission standards, it appears
from the actual wording of the provisions that Congressional intent
was not so limited. The proposed House version calls for compli-
ance not only with emission standards but also with "the purposes
of this Clean Air Act"4 6 while the Senate provision contains the
broader term "requirements of this Act."47
There is strong evidence to suggest that the Senate in particular
had no intent to limit federal agency compliance to only emission
standards. The Senate report in reference to state implementation
plans reads:
The establishment alone of ambient air quality standards has little
effect on air quality. Standards are only the reference point for
the analysis of the factors contributing to air pollution and the
imposition of control strategy and tactics. This program is an im-
plementation plan .... The Committee recognizes that the imple-
mentation plan is the principal component of control efforts for
43. 116 CoNG. REc. 19207 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Springer) (emphasis
added).
44. S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 43 (1970) (emphasis added).
45. SENATE Comm. ON PUBLIC WORKS, S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2nd
Sess. 23 (1970) (emphasisadded).
46. H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 24 (1970).
47. S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 43 (1970).
polluting agents for which national standards are established. It
is this program which must be effective if the Nation is to achieve
the quality of air which the bill would mandate in a relatively
short period of time.48
The final wording of Section 118 calling for compliance with "re-
quirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution" 9
was worked out by a House-Senate conference committee. In its
report the conference committee said that Section 118 declared that
"departments and agencies should comply with applicable stand-
ards of air quality and emissions." 50
Given that the conference committee's comment was written as
part of a summary of the Clean Air Act's major provisions, it
should not be taken as totally dispositive of Congressional intent.
There is much room for argument that implicit in the statement
is a directive that federal agencies comply with all regulations de-
signed to enforce standards of air quality and emissions.
Insight into the intended scope of Section 118 and the nature of
the conference committee comment on it can be gained by looking
at other portions of the Clean Air Act's legislative history, specifi-
cally that related to Section 116.51 This section provides:
... nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of
any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1)
any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants
or (2) any requirement respecting control and abatement of air
pollution .... 62
Clearly at this point Congress used the phrase "requirement re-
specting control or abatement of air pollution" to mean something
other than mere emission limitations. If this were not the case
subparagraph two would be superfluous. Yet even here where the
distinction is clear, the conference report says merely that ". . . the
States' authority to adopt and enforce standards applicable to air
quality and emissions is retained. '53
Read together the two sections and their legislative history sug-
gest that:
1. the legislative history, being only a summary of the proposed
law, should not be read too narrowly and should not be taken as
conclusive of the meaning of the provisions; and
48. SENATE Covnm. oN PuBLic WORKS, supra note 45 at 11 (emphasis
added).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970).
50. HOUSE-SENATE CoNnENcE COmm., REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2nd
Sess. 5381 (1970).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE COMMvn., supra note 50 at 48 (emphasis
added).
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2. the phrase "requirements respecting control and abatement
of air pollution" was not intended to encompass merely emission
standards but rather the whole gamut of control measures, includ-
ing operating permits.
Turning away from the legislative history for the moment, the
wording of Section 118 of the Clean Air Act itself implies that
Congress intended that federal agencies comply with all local pol-
lution control laws, both substantive and procedural.
There is nothing in the word "requirements" which suggests a
distinction between so-called substantive and procedural regula-
tions. If Congress had intended to limit federal agency compliance
to emission standards and compliance schedules it could have easily
stated such. But Congress used the words "requirements respect-
ing control and abatement of air pollution," words which seem to
encompass a broad spectrum of regulations beyond mere emission
standards.
It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that effect
must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of
a statute54 -here the phrase "to the same extent as any other per-
son." 55 The phrase could be construed to modify the verb
"comply" indicating that since a person would be obligated to com-
ply fully with a requirement so too must a federal agency. Such
construction, however, renders the phrase meaningless since the
word "comply" in and of itself mandates full compliance. The al-
ternative is to read the phrase "to the same extent as any other
person" in connection with the phrase "comply with requirements
respecting control and abatement of air pollution." Read this way
the words suggest that Congress has waived the sovereign immu-
nity of federal facilities and placed them on a par with private
polluters. Hence, federal facilities, like private persons, must com-
ply with all pollution control requirements regardless of whether
they are substantive or procedural.
The Clean Air Act Scheme
Looking beyond Section 118 to other provisions of the Clean Air
Act, the argument is even more persuasive that federal facilities
54. J. SuTHERLAwD, STATuTEs Aw STATUTORY CoxsTRucTIox, § 46.06 (4th
ed. C. Stands 1972).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970).
must comply with all local pollution control requirements, includ-
ing permit procedures.
As mentioned previously,55 in Section 116 of the Clean Air Act 7
Congress clearly demonstrated that the phrase "requirement re-
specting control and abatement of air pollution" was intended to
mean something other than mere emission limitations. There is
no reason to attribute a more limited meaning to the phrase in
the context of Section 118 than that demanded by Section 116.
In two sections of the Clean Air Act Congress specifically pro-
vides that states should not have the power to enforce certain regu-
lations against federal facilities. Section 11, standards of perform-
ance for new stationary sources, reads,
Each state may develop and submit to the Administrator a pro-
cedure for implementing and enforcing standards of performance
for new sources located in such State. If the Administrator finds
the State procedure is adequate, he shall delegate to such state
any authority he has under this chapter to implement and enforce
such standards (except with respect to new sources owned or op-
erated by the United States).58
The same exemption from state enforcement for sources owned or
operated by the United States is included in Section 112(d) (1) per-
taining to state plans to enforce national emission standards for
hazardous air pollutants. 59 No such exemption is made, however,
in the section ordering state implementation, maintenance and en-
forcement of national air quality standards. 60 Since Congress
made exemptions in certain areas, it is only logical to assume that
where no exemption was expressed, no exemption was intended.
As the Court of Appeals points out in Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus,61
Section 304,62 the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, does
not expressly authorize citizen suits to force governmental compli-
ance with local permit procedures. Contrary to the appellate
court's interpretation of Section 304, however, it can be argued that
the section was not intended as a waiver of sovereign immunity
but rather was aimed at encouraging suits against violators of the
Clean Air Act by broadening traditional standing requirements to
allow "any person" to bring suit, but placing certain limitations
on such suits.
56. See text accompanying notes 51-53, supra.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970) (emphasis added).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7 (1970).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
61. - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1974); 6 ERC 1644. See text accompanying
footnotes 19-23.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). See footnote 21 for text of section.
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Evidence of such intent appears in subsection (e) of 3043 which
reads:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common
law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation
or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Adminis-
trator or a state agency).64
Additional support is found in the House-Senate Conference
Committee report which states that citizen suits
against violators, including the United States and other govern-
ment agencies to the extent permitted by the Constitution, would
also be authorized. 65
Taking these two expressed intentions together it would seem
that the citizen suit provision was not intended as a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity but rather any such waiver must be found in
other parts of the act, i.e. Section 118.
The Value of a Permit System
The mandate to the states under the Clean Air Act is to achieve
and maintain overall air quality. The instruction from Congress
is not solely to limit the amount of pollution each facility or in-
strumentality may emit but rather to regulate all sources of pollu-
tion such that the air will contain no more than a given percentage
of contaminants. 66 In order to achieve such air quality each air
pollution region must necessarily have the power to regulate all
emission sources within the region. If any one or more sources
are allowed to operate independent of regional control it may make
it impossible to maintain an air quality standard.
Permit procedures have long been a typical means employed by
governmental entities to control activities limited by law. Coin-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. House-Senate Conf. Comm., Rep. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 5381(1970). The Conference Committee report also notes that the House ver-
sion of the Clean Air Act did not contain a citizen suit provision. This
seems to negate any interpretation of the citizen suit provision as a waiver
of sovereign immunity without which federal agencies could not be subject
to the Clean Air Act, since the House version of the act expressly man-
dated federal compliance with "emission standards and the purposes of this
Act." See text accompanying footnote 40.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-4, 1857c-5 (1970).
mon examples include the licensing of automobile drivers to make
certain that they meet qualifications established for them by the
state legislature and building permits to insure compliance with
zoning regulations and building codes. Without such permit pro-
cedures it would be virtually impossible for the government to pro-
vide comprehensive enforcement of such laws.
Contrary to the statement of the district court in Kentucky v.
Ruckelshaus that "a permit has absolutely nothing to do with air
quality,"0 7 a permit procedure does contribute to control of air pol-
lution. Permit applications provide vital information as to what
pollutants a facility will emit and where and when such emissions
will occur. If a facility lacks the capability to meet local emission
standards, this can be immediately discovered through the permit
procedure and the pollution control agency can order that remedial
measures be taken, thereby preventing pollution in the first in-
stance. If it is determined that a facility can meet emission stand-
ards and a permit is issued, the permit-issuing agency has the nec-
essary information to enable it to monitor emissions to insure con-
tinuing compliance with emission limitations. Information pro-
vided in permit applications also aids the local pollution control
agency in determining the total amount of air pollutants emitted
within its air quality region. Thus the agency is better able to
calculate the total amount of contaminants which may be emitted
by all sources within the region without violation of the region's
air quality standards.
Reflective of the value of a permit system is the initial inclusion
of a mandatory permit system in the requirements for state imple-
mentation plans promulgated by the Environmental Protection
Agency.68 The mandatory permit system requirement was elimi-
nated from the final version of the EPA regulations but states
still are required to possess authority
... to prevent the construction, modification or operation of any
stationary source at a location where emissions from such source
will prevent attainment or maintenance of national air quality
standards.69
The National Council on Environmental Quality in its 1973 re-
port, referring to the permit system required under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act,70 said,
67. 362 F. Supp. 360, 365 (W.D. Ky. 1973), affirmed, - F.2d - (6th
Cir. 1974), 6 ERC 1644.
68. 36 Fed. Reg. 6682 (1971).
69. 40 C.F.R. § 51.11 (1972).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. II 1972). Seg text accompanying
notes 75-101, infra,
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Once the permit system is fully operational, it should provide a
comprehensive picture of the pollution coming from point sources
as well as a vital tool for reducing such pollution.71
The argument may be made that by forcing federal agencies to
submit to local permit procedures the courts would be giving local
governments power to control federal government activities in der-
ogation of the clear mandate of McCulloch v. Maryland.7 2 Such
an argument is somewhat misleading. By ordering federal facili-
ties to comply with local emission standards Congress waived the
immunity from local regulation given the federal government
by the Supremacy Clause. Given this waiver, the real question
is whether compliance with local procedural requirements would
be a significant additional burden on federal facilities, and, if so,
is the burden beyond that sanctioned by the Clean Air Act.
If a federal agency must comply with local substantive law and
local permits must issue as long as such substantive law is obeyed,
then the effect of the permit procedure solely is to enable the local
government to determine if the agency is indeed obeying the law.
In this sense the permit procedure imposes no additional burden
on the federal agency since it is already legally obligated to do
all those things which will entitle it to a permit. Assuming that
Congress would not on the one hand order federal agency com-
pliance with local law and on the other hand deliberately provide
the means by which agencies might circumvent the law, it seems
logical to assume that Congress intended to subject federal facil-
ities to state procedural requirements.
The flaw in the above rationale is that even if a permit proce-
dure does not alter the operational requirements imposed on a fed-
eral facility, it gives the local government the very significant
power to determine in the first instance if a federal agency is in
technical compliance with local air pollution regulations. By obli-
gating federal agencies to comply with local permit procedures one
vests in local governments the power to halt federal government
operations by denying or revoking operating permits. The burden
is then on the federal agency to seek administrative or judicial
relief from such a determination by proving compliance. Pending
71. CouNcIL ON ENvrmoN ENTAL QuALiT=, FoURT ANNUAL REPORT 280
(1973) (emphasis added).
72. 4Wheat. 316 (1819).
the grant of such relief the federal activity may be inhibited. On
the other hand if the federal agency is exempt from permit proce-
dures the local government, sua sponte, cannot interfere with fed-
eral government operations. Rather it must request federal ad-
ministrative or judicial intervention and pending such intervention
the facility will be free to continue its operations without inter-
ference.
Although concern over state interference with the federal func-
tion is legitimate to some extent, it should not be used to justify
a narrow interpretation of the phrase "requirements respecting
control and abatement of air pollution." Congress, "recognizing
that it may be in the paramount interest of the United States that
a plant or facility not achieve full pollution control within the time
required," 73 gave the President the authority to exempt individual
federal facilities from such requirements.7 4
Another consideration is the impact of the varying state rules
on federal government operation. If an agency must comply with
different rules in each state in which it operates facilities, overall
coordination of the agency's activities will be more difficult. Con-
gress must have recognized and accepted this, however, when it
ordered federal facilities to comply with local regulations. The in-
convenience exists in that federal facilities must comply with vary-
ing emission standards. Therefore although additional inconveni-
ence might be caused by varying state procedural requirements,
this argument in itself provides little justification for exempting
federal facilities from such procedural requirements.
73. SENATE COMM. oN PuBLIc WORKS, supra note 45.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970). The section provides that:
[nJo exemption may be granted from section 1857c-6 [Standards
for performance of new stationary sources] of this title, and an ex-
emption from section 1857c-7 [Emission Standards for Hazardous
Pollutants] of this title may be granted only in accordance with
section 1857c-7(c) of this title. No such exemption shall be
granted due to lack of appropriations unless the President shall
have specifically requested such appropriation as a part of the
budgetary process and the Congress shall have failed to make
available such requested appropriation.
Section 1857-7(c) allows for exemptions only if the President finds that
"technology to implement such standards is not available and the operation
of such source is required for reasons of national security." This provision
for presidential exemption of individual federal facilities from pollution
regulations does much to avoid any dilemma created by a failure of Con-
gress to appropriate the funds necessary to enable federal agencies to obey
the mandate of the Clean Air Act. The dilemma would remain in relation
to those sections of the Clean Air Act pertaining to standards of perform-
ance for stationary sources, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970), and emission stand-
ards for hazardous air pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 1867c-7 (1970), since the
President's power to grant exemptions from them is restricted, except that
both sections expressly deny the states the authority to enforce such stand-
ards against federal facilities.
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FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
Prior to the 1972 enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act,75 Section 21 (a) of the Water Control Act of 1970 required
that each federal agency
... having jurisdiction over any real property or facility, or en-
gaged in any Federal public works activity of any kind, shall, con-
sistent with the paramount interest of the United States as deter-
mined by the President, insure compliance with applicable water
quality standards and the purposes of this act in the administra-
tion of such property, facility, or activity.76
The legislative history of Section 21(a) indicates that Congress
intended federal agency compliance with state and local water
quality standards. 77 In 1971 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California in the case of California v. David-
son75 ruled that the phrase "applicable water quality standards"
found in Section 21(a) included state water quality standards and
hence the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar a California
suit for injunctive -and monetary relief.
Against this background Congress enacted Section 313 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act stipulating that federal agen-
cies and instrumentalities
... shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local require-
ments respecting control and abatement of pollution to the same
extent that any person is subject to such requirements including
the payment of reasonable service charges. 7 9
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1351 et seq. (Supp. EI, 1972).
76. Act of April 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, Title I § 102, 103, 84 Stat.
91, 107, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (Supp. II, 1972).
77. See HousE CoMMnv. ON PUBLIc WORKS, H.R. REP. No. 127, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 19 (1969); HOUSE-SENATE CoNF. Comm., H.R. REP. No. 940, 91st
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
78. 3 ERC 1157, No. C-70-487-SAW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 1971).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (Supp. 11, 1972). The remaining portion of the sec-
tion reads:
The President may exempt any effluent source of any department,
agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compli-
ance with any such a requirement if he determines it to be in
the paramount interest of the United States to do so; except that
no exemption may be granted from the requirements of section
1316 or 1317 of this title. No such exemptions shall be granted
due to lack of appropriation unless the President shall have speci-
fically requested such appropriation as a part of the budgetary
process and the Congress shall have failed to make available such
requested appropriation. Any exemption shall be for a period not
in excess of one year, but additional exemptions may be granted
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The only real difference between the wording of this section and
the like provision in the Clean Air Act 80 is the addition of the
words "including the payment of reasonable service charges."
The Senate Public Works Committee report on the Senate ver-
sion of the water pollution bill is somewhat ambiguous. The sub-
heading of the paragraph explaining Section 313 reads,
This section, similar to the one in existing law, requires that Fed-
eral facilities meet the same effluent limitations as private sources
of pollution.81
The more detailed explanation immediately below this subhead-
ing contains the following:
Lack of Federal leadership has been detrimental to the water pol-
lution control effort. The Federal Government cannot expect pri-
vate industry to abate pollution if the Federal Government con-
tinues to pollute. This section requires that Federal facilities meet
all control requirements as if they were private citizens.8 2
The House-Senate Conference Committee reported that, whereas
the House bill had required federal facilities "to meet the same
requirements as private sources of pollution" 8s and the Senate bill
had required federal facilities to "meet the same effluent limita-
tions as other sources of pollution,"8 4 the conference substitute "is
the same" as the House and Senate bills.8 5
Given that the House version of the provision was interpreted
to require federal facilities to meet the same requirements as pri-
vate sources of pollution and that the Senate committee, in the more
elaborate of two statements on the provision, interpreted it as re-
quiring federal agency compliance with all control requirements
as if the agencies were private persons, there is little support for a
contention that Congress intended to limit compliance merely to
substantive requirements. Such a contention is particularly unpala-
table in that the law formerly required compliance with state and
local water quality standards. If Congress had desired federal
agency compliance with only substantive standards, the 1972
for periods of not to exceed one year upon the President's making
a new determination. The President shall report each January to
the Congress all exemptions from the requirements of this sectiongranted during the preceding calendar year, together with his rea-
son for granting such exemption.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970).
81. SENATE Comm. ON PuBLIc WoaxS, S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 3733 (1971).
82. Id.
83. HOUSE-SENATE CONF. Comm., S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
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amendment would have been unnecessary and there would be no
justification for the adoption of the more expansive language in-
cluded within that amendment.
Other sections of the water pollution control act provide ample
evidence that Congress intended federal agency compliance with
more than emission limitations.
Section 510 of the act provides,
* . . nothing in this Act shall (1) preclude or deny the right of
any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to
adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting dis-
charges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control
or abatement of pollution .... 86
As in the Clean Air Act,87 Congress within this provision of the
water pollution act clearly manifested an intent to give the phrase
"requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution" a
meaning beyond that of mere emission limitations. Yet the House-
Senate Conference report in summarizing the provision says it pro-
vides
* . . that States, political subdivisions, and interstate agencies re-
tain the right to set more restrictive standards and limitations than
those imposed under this Act.8 8
Reading sections 313 and 510 and their legislative histories
together, one reaches conclusions parallel to those implied by the
like provisions in the Clean Air Act:
1. The legislative history is a mere summary of the bill's major
provisions and should not be taken as dispositive of Congressional
intent; and
2. The phrase "requirements respecting control and abatement
of air pollution" cannot be construed to mean merely emission lim-
itations.
Of special significance is Section 505 of the Water Pollution Con-
trol Act which authorizes citizen suits against any person, includ-
ing the United States,
... who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard
or limitation under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Ad-
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. II, 1972) (emphasis added).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).
88. Hous. SENATE Coxr. COmm., supra note 83, at - (emphasis added).
ministrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation
.. .89
Subsection (f) of 505 provides that for the purposes of the section
the term "effluent standard or limitation" means, among other
things,
* . a permit or condition thereof issued under section 402 of this
Act, which is in effect under this Act (including a requirement
applicable by reason of section 313 of this Act).9 0
Section 40291 provides for a state discharge permit program while
Section 313 is the section mandating federal compliance with local
pollution requirements. This provision in itself seems to imply
that Section 313 must be read as a mandate that federal agencies
comply with local permit programs. The inclusion of permit re-
quirements in the citizen suit provision of the Water Pollution Con-
trol Act clearly eliminates application of the reasoning used by the
appeals court in Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus92 to justify exemption
of federal facilities from local permit requirements relating to air
pollution. Yet it seems irrational to attribute different meanings
to the federal compliance provisions of the Clean Air and Water
Pollution Control Acts when these provisions are identically worded.
It appears that where Congress felt federal agencies should be
exempt from local enforcement powers it so stated. In the sec-
tion relating to national standards of performance 93 Congress pro-
vided that each state may develop and submit to the administrator
a procedure for applying and enforcing standards of performance.
If the administrator finds the procedure adequate the state shall
be authorized to apply and enforce such standards of performance
-except with respect to new sources owned or operated by the
United States.0 4
In Section 4019 concerning the issuance of federal licenses for
discharges into navigable waters, applicants for federal permits are
specifically required, as a prerequisite for such permits, to obtain
certification from the concerned states that the facilities will com-
ply with state water quality requirements. It is expressly pro-
vided, however, that no federal agency shall be deemed an appli-
cant for the purposes of the subsection.96
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II, 1972).
90. Id.
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. II, 1972).
92. - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying footnotes 19-23.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (c) (Supp. II, 1972).
94. Id.
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. H, 1972).
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (b) (Supp. II, 1972).
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Yet in Section 40297 wherein Congress provides for state take-
over of the permit program, there is no exemption for federal agen-
cies. To the contrary the House-Senate Conference Committee re-
port notes that subsection (b) (2) (B) of the provision "is revised
to remove the exemption for federally owned and operated point
sources from inspection, monitoring and reporting requirements."98
Although this statement contradicts the words of Section 308 99 of
the Act which denies the states the right to enforce inspection,
monitoring and entry regulations against point sources owned or
operated by the United States, it is at least indicative of an intent
to obligate federal agencies to apply for and obtain local operating
permits.
An additional argument in support of reading the act as man-
dating federal agency compliance with all pollution control re-
quirements is a policy expressed in the Act itself. Section 101(f)
reads,
It is the national policy that to the maximum extent possible
the procedures utilized for implementing this Act shall encourage
the drastic minimization of paperwork and interagency decision
procedures, and the best use of available manpower and funds,
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. II, 1972).
98. HOUSE-SENATE CoiN. Comm., supra note 83 at 139.
The original House version of this subsection, H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. - (1972), required that states desiring to enforce their own discharge
permit programs possess adequate authority to
issue permits which apply, and insure compliance with, all
applicable requirements of section 308 of this act, or (B) except
with respect to sources owned or operated by the United States to
inspect, monitor, enter and request reports to at least the same ex-
tent as required in section 308 of this act .... (emphasis added).
As enacted into law the subsection reads:
... to issue permits which apply, and insure compliance with all
applicable requirements of section 308 of this act or (B) to inspect,
monitor, enter and require reports to at least the same extent as
required in section 308 of this act.... 33 U.S.C. 1342 (Supp. II,
1972).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (Supp. 11, 1972).
This section expressly provides that:
Each state may develop and submit to the Administrator proce-
dures under State law for inspection, monitoring, and entry with
respect to point sources located in such State. If the Administra-
tor finds that the procedures and the law of any State relating
to inspection, monitoring, and entry are applicable at least to the
same extent as those required by this section, such State is author-
ized to apply and enforce its procedures for inspection, monitoring,
and entry with respect to point sources located in such state (ex-
cept with respect to point sources owned or operated by the United
States. (emphasis added).
so as to prevent needless duplication and unnecessary delays at
all levels of government.' 00
If Section 313 is interpreted narrowly such that federal agencies
are exempted from local permit procedures and other enforcement-
oriented local regulations, state and local agencies will be unable
to force federal facilities to comply with substantive water quality
standards. 0 1 In order for the provisions of the Water Pollution
Control Act to be enforced, the Environmental Protection Agency
would have to develop its own enforcement mechanism and make
available personnel to enforce the varying emission standards in
each of the 50 states. This would result in needless duplication
of effort and a waste of manpower.
NOISE CONTROL ACT OF 1972
The Noise Control Act of 1972102 provides that federal agencies
and instrumentalities "shall comply with Federal, State, interstate,
and local requirements respecting control and abatement of envi-
ronmental noise to the same extent that any person is subject to
such requirements.1103 The wording of this provision is nearly
identical to the like provisions of the Clean Air Act'0 4 and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 0 5
The original House version of the Noise Control Act'0 6 lacked a
provision regarding federal agency compliance with noise control
requirements. The Senate version of the bill 07 contained the pro-
vision eventually enacted into law. The Senate committee report
on the noise bill reads merely that the section requires "all federal
agencies to operate all federal facilities and programs under federal
law in a manner consistent with the standards and policies of this
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (f) (Supp. IA 1972).
101. In some instances the lack of authority to require federal agencies
to participate in administrative proceedings relating to pollution control
may preclude states from establishing substantive water quality standards.
California law, for example, provides for establishment, through adminis-
trative proceedings, of individualized discharge criteria for each point
source. If federal agencies are not required to submit to the administrative
process, California will be unable to establish discharge criteria for point
sources. This is one of the key arguments being made by the State of
California in its suit against the Environmental Protection Agency over
EPA's rejection of that portion of California's pollution control implemen-
tation plan regulating discharges from federal facilities. See footnote 7,
supra.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 4901 et seq. (Supp. I, 1972).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 4903 (b) (Supp. II, 1972).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (Supp. II, 1972).
106. H.R. 11021, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
107. S. 3343, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
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Act."'0 8  Unfortunately this explanation goes more to paragraph
406(a) 10 9 directing federal agencies to carry out programs under
their control in a manner consistent with the policy of the Noise
Control Act, than it does to 406(b)" 0 concerning the compliance
of federal facilities with noise control requirements.
The Noise Control Act is markedly different from the air and
water pollution control acts in that it does not provide for the
developinent of state implementation plans and regulations. Rather
it is concerned primarily with the identification of major sources
of noise and the promulgation of noise standards for products dis-
tributed in commerce. The Act expressly states, however, that it
shall not be construed to preclude or deny the right of a state
or political subdivisions thereof to
• . . establish and enforce controls on environmental noise (or one
or more sources thereof) through the licensing, regulation, or
restriction of the use, operation, or movement of any product or
combination of products."'
The Senate committee report on this section of the noise bill
states in part,
At a minimum, States and local governments may reach or main-
tain levels of environmental noise which they desire through (a)
operational limits or regulations on products in use (such as speed
or load limits or prohibition of use in given areas or during given
hours); (b) quantitative limits on environmental noise in a given
area which may be enforced against any source within the area
112
Given that the Act specifically recognizes the right of a state
to institute controls on environmental noise through licensing," 3
it seems reasonable to assume that when Congress spoke of "local
requirements respecting control and abatement of environmental
noise" it was not limiting compliance to merely emission limita-
tions.
EXECUTIVE ORDmS
The first executive order issued by the President following the
108. SENAT Com. ON PUmLic Wosxs, S. REP. No. 1160, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1972).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 4903 (a) (Supp. II, 1972).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 4903 (b) (Supp. II, 1972).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 4905 (Supp. II, 1972).
112. SENATE ConVr. ON PuBLIc WoREs, supra note 111, at 8.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 4905 (e) (2) (Supp. II, 1972).
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 directed federal facilities to "con-
form to air and water quality standards as defined in section 2(d)
of this order."1 1 4 Section 2(d) provided that
[t]he term 'air and water quality standards' shall mean respec-
tively the quality standards and related plans of implementation,
including emission standards, adopted pursuant to the Clean Air
Act, as amended, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
as amended .... 115
Under this executive order, as long as state permit programs and
other procedural requirements were a part of a state's implementa-
tion plan federal agencies would be obligated to comply therewith.
On December 17, 1973, a date subsequent to the federal district
court rulings in California v. Statsny,116 Alabama v. Seeber"1 and
Kentucky v. Ruckelshaus,"58 the President issued a new executive
order"10 which reads,
Compliance by Federal facilities with Federal, State, interstate,
and local substantive standards and substantive limitations, to the
same extent that any person is subject to such standards and limi-
tations, will accomplish the objective of providing Federal leader-
ship and cooperation in the prevention of environmental pollution.
In light of the principle of Federal supremacy embodied in the
Constitution, this order is not intended, nor should it be inter-
preted, to require Federal facilities to comply with State or local
administrative procedures with respect to pollution abatement and
control.'20
The executive order directs heads of federal agencies to insure
that all facilities under their jurisdiction conform to
Federal, State, interstate, and local air quality standards and emis-
sion limitations adopted in accordance with or effective under the
provisions of the Clean Air Act, as amended ....
Federal, State, interstate, and local water quality standards and
effluent limitations respecting the discharge or runoff of pollutants
adopted in accordance with or effective under the provisions of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended ....
Federal noise emission standards for products adopted in accord-
ance with provisions of the Noise Control Act of 1972 and State,
114. Exec. Order No. 11507, 3 C.F.R. 1966-1970 Comp. at 889, 42 U.S.C.
4331 (1970).
115. Id.
116. 4 ERC 1447 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 1972), appeal pending 9th Circuit.
117. No. 72-939 (N.D. Ala. June 5, 1973), notice of appeal filed June 28,
1973.
118. 362 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1974).
119. Exec. Order No. 11752, 38 Fed. Reg. 34793 (1973) (emphasis added).
120. Id. at § 1 (emphasis added).
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interstate, and local standards for control and abatement of en-
vironmental noise .... 121
Because the later order apparently is intended merely to reflect
recent lower court interpretations of the Clean Air Act provision,
it should not be allowed to influence future judicial consideration
of the meaning of the provisions in the air, water and noise pollu-
tion control acts relating to pollution from federal facilities.
CONCLUSION
The provisions of the air, water and noise pollution control acts
mandating federal agency compliance with state and local pollution
regulations are almost identically worded and it seems apparent
that the similarity was intended. Rationally therefore the three
provisions should be uniformly interpreted and the three acts and
their legislative histories should be viewed as a package in making
the interpretation.
The intent of the air, water and noise pollution control acts was
and is to clean up and preserve the physical environment of the
United States. Congress, in its discretion, chose to vest primary
responsibility for this task in the various state governments. 122
Recognizing that federal facilities are a major source of pollution,
Congress ordered that federal agencies must comply with federal,
state, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and
abatement of pollution to the same extent as any other person.123
The wording of this order on its face is clear and unambiguous.
There is nothing in the legislative history that positively estab-
lishes Congressional intent to distinguish between substantive and
procedural requirements. To the contrary in several areas the leg-
islative history strongly suggests an intent that the phrase be
broadly construed. If the phrase is held to refer only to substan-
tive requirements such as emission limitations and federal facili-
ties are thereby exempted from compliance with local permit pro-
cedures, the efforts of local agencies to eliminate air, water and
121. Id. at § 4 (emphasis added).
122. 42 U.S.C. 1857(a) (3) (1970); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. 1I, 1972);
42 U.S.C. § 4901 (a) (3) (Supp. H, 1972).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f (1970); 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (Supp. II, 1972); 42 U.S.C.
4903(b) (Supp. 11, 1972).
noise pollution will be significantly hampered.
The courts should not read into the law exceptions which are
neither expressed nor implied therein and which result in frustra-
tion of the overall policy of that law. If Congress, in fact, feels
that federal facilities should be exempt from local procedural re-
quirements respecting pollution control it should amend the pollu-
tion control acts. Until that time the courts should enforce those
acts as written.
JAcKLYzN BECKER
